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The Reporting Dilemma: Clarifying the Record on SEC Reporting in Chapter 11
Jeff Stegenga

Bailment: The Fallacy Cost Reduction
Michael Marcus

What if the Turnaround Professional Reports to an Incompetent Board?
Miles Stover

Kmart Ruling May Threaten "Critcal Vendors" Elevated Status
Steven J. Solomon, Esq., Sara Fain

Managing Your Working Capital
Ed McDonough

The Debtor's Digital Reckonings
Jack Seward

Meet the Board

Tax Cases
Alan Barton, CIRA

Bankruptcy Cases
Baxter Dunaway

Club 10

New CIRA

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IWIRC Update

Plan of Reorganization 2003 Recap


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October/November
2003

Bailment: The Fallacy of Cost Reduction


Michael Marcus, CPA
Stout Risius Ross, Inc.

The notion of cutting pennies from unit prices or reducing manufacturing costs by tenths of a percentage point represent to most people seemingly small and uninviting prospects for improving a company’s bottom line. However, in the mega-scale economies that exist in the automotive industry, such opportunities are pursued most aggressively. The sheer size of the industry financially justifies the pursuit of such unitarily small improvements. However, while the drive for productivity produces many innovative and initially unconventional, but brilliantly successful solutions, there are times when apparently feasible and novel ideas can spawn only unforeseen complications and difficulty.

Recently, the automotive industry’s Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEM’s), e.g. DCX, Ford, GM, Toyota, Nissan, et al., have been considering a proposal to reduce material costs by using bailment agreements within their supply chain. A quick look at the industry shows that the complex, multi-level task of manufacturing automotive components requires the input of many suppliers and sub-suppliers prior to parts arriving at the OEM’s assembly plant. This has resulted in a tier structure of suppliers in the industry, whereby direct suppliers to the OEM are classified as Tier 1’s. Companies supplying the Tier 1’s are classified as Tier 2 suppliers (one step removed from the OEM) and so on. Furthermore, over the past few years the OEM’s, having concluded that the proliferation of direct suppliers was unnecessary and a cost penalty, moved to consolidate (reduce) their Tier 1 supply base. This reduction of the supply base, together with placing more product development at the suppliers, created Tier 1 suppliers of very large proportions, e.g. Bosch, Delphi, Visteon, et al.

Normally, the Tier 1 suppliers are provided a free rein to source sub-components to the Tier 2 supply base. However, in certain instances, the OEM’s have required (directed) the Tier 1 to use a specific Tier 2 on certain car platforms or applications. This directed-source supply situation has caught the attention of the OEMs as a potential area for cost savings. The issue revolves around profit margins paid to Tier 1’s on the components supplied by Tier 2’s in a directed-source situation. There is a consensus at the OEM’s that such margins are non-value added costs, because the OEM is doing the work in directing the sourcing of the component. The Tier 1’s disputed the OEM position and responded that it was necessary to mark up even directed-source components in order to cover costs and maintain profit margins.

One of the recent OEM responses to this “inequitable” situation was to devise a manner to take the Tier 1 out-of-the-loop by deploying a bailment agreement. The methodology entails the OEM issuing a purchase order directly to the Tier 2 supplier for components that are then delivered under bailment to the Tier 1 supplier for conversion to a finished state or assembly into a finished component for delivery to the OEM. In the above methodology, the Tier 1 does not take ownership of the Tier 2’s product. Accordingly, the OEM’s have reasoned that the “need” to mark-up the material cost is avoided as such costs no longer pass through the financial statements of the Tier 1. Seemingly a sound rationale, but even this argument is problematic, as discussed later.

Bailment Demands a Different Perspective

The bailment process can be a viable alternative to standard commercial transactional process provided that the OEM, the Tier 1 and Tier 2 suppliers are well prepared for the commercial and legal differences that accompany this method of business.

Commercially, the OEM and the Tier 1 must be able to track and identify bailed inventory. This concept is not always appreciated or well-practiced by U.S. manufacturing business. Most inventory control systems, including but not limited to the computer driven software, are not set-up with bailment in mind. In fact many companies have difficulty effectively controlling their own inventory, let alone adding the complication of bailed inventory. Typically, bailed inventory control systems are off-line systems set–up to accommodate the infrequent demand of bailment. As such, physical controls and procedures are not integrated onto the MRP system and therefore not capable of properly recording high volume transactions. Physically segregating bailed inventory could be useful to identify bailed inventory, however, the segregation control becomes irrelevant once the bailed inventory is integrated into the assembly/manufacturing operations at the Tier 1.

Additional commercial considerations for the OEM come along with the bailment process. The OEM must record bailed inventory on its books and ensure that the Tier 2 supplier is paid on-time for the appropriate level of material delivered. Freight and duty costs to deliver the material to the Tier 1 will also be incurred and will require verification. The OEM must monitor the accuracy of the Tier 1’s inventory records reconciling these to its own records. The OEM must also ensure adequate insurance coverage. Finally, the effectiveness of the above controls and procedures becomes further complicated, because Tier 1s function in a remote environment, physically separated from the OEM facility and its management oversight. The remote situation presents significantly greater potential for critical controls to be compromised, thereby resulting in inventory losses.

It is in the legal arena that the feasibility of bailment finds the most significant challenges. Initially, there must be a bailment agreement between the OEM and the Tier 1 supplier. Subsequently, appropriate UCC searches are required followed by notification to creditors with security interest or liens advising them of the bailment. This process continues with the filing of a notice UCC financing statement that describes the bailment agreement. Only when all of these steps are properly executed should the OEM initiate the bailment process. On a “go forward” basis, the OEM should also monitor the Tier 1 to ensure that the bailed inventory is properly excluded from the borrowing base certificates that are presented to the lender. Additional consideration in the legal area needs to be given to the form and content of the OEM’s purchase orders and its warranty and product liability issues. This is of special concern when the OEM is providing components to its Tier 1 for conversion/assembly. The question of warranty and product liability can become clouded in situations where there are several suppliers for one component.

Also, it should be well noted that the above requirements mandate additional system and manpower costs on the part of the OEM and the Tier 1 supplier. In fact, deployment of the bailment arrangement will result in increasing the number of Tier 1’s to the OEM’s supply base. A process that counters recent trends and will most certainly add cost to the procurement process.

The Troubled Supplier Scenario

If a Tier 1, functioning under a bailed inventory arrangement with the OEM, becomes financially distressed (“a troubled supplier” situation), then a more complicated workout scenario can result. Troubled supplier situations are never easy on any of the participants. It is more a game of minimizing losses than in gaining advantage or breaking even. Troubled companies are subjected to demands from many stakeholders including unsecured trade creditors, secured lenders and customers (OEM’s). Each of these has their own agenda: the banks are looking for collateral and for the customers to “share the pain”, the customers want an uninterrupted supply of components and, often-times, to exit the relationship, while the unsecured are looking to someone to make them whole. The common denominator is that each is fighting for a share of the troubled company’s dwindling pie of economic value.

Into this controversy enters the situation of bailed inventory. Even if the OEM has done the right things and followed the proper steps, there is risk of loss to the OEM. The bank often has secured status to all the Tier 1’s assets which includes inventory. In the event that the bailed inventory has been put into production and is now part of a Tier 1 assembly, to whom does the value of the bailed inventory accrue? Does it become part of the bank’s collateral? If so, how does the OEM recover its outlay? (Of note is the fact that there is case law currently under review that the bank can assert a secured claim over bailed inventory.) Can the OEM receive a recovery of the value of the bailed inventory? If the bank has other claims against the OEM in the situation, can it exert set-off? How is the value of the bailed inventory determined? Can the OEM “remove” its components from the Tier 1’s assembled product? What if removal is physically not possible? What if the Tier 1’s plants have multiple suppliers of the same components and the bailed inventory has not been segregated? If it is a case of a fungible product, then which accounting records control the division of product value?

While there are many ways to resolve the above questions, the important fact is that resolution will take additional time, effort and negotiation among all the parties involved. Such negotiations are almost never bilateral and usually require three or more parties in interest to agree (e.g., banks, customer(s) and unsecured creditors). This can be especially disconcerting as time is often of the essence in ensuring the flow of product to the customers.

The Fallacy of Cost Savings

As previously mentioned, the main driver behind the bailment proposal is the desire to reduce costs. While the complications of effectively deploying a bailment based inventory system have been discussed above, the realization of cost savings have not been fully considered. Most importantly, the Tier 1 markup cannot be completely eliminated, as certain costs of maintaining the Tier 2 must continue and be covered by margin, such as quality assurance, order processing, scheduling, systems support, receiving and engineering. New systems will have to be developed and additional manpower added by the Tier 1 to manage the bailed inventory system.

The bailment process will almost certainly result in additional inventory in the overall supply base system, i.e., Tier 1 and OEM combined. Tier 1’s will have reduced incentive to manage inventory levels because the inventory will not be on their books, and the OEM will be hard pressed to reduce inventory. The inventory will be offsite and not subject to the daily controls and management attention that come when inventory is physically present. The additional inventory levels will generate increased expenses due to loss and damage, storage, freight and handling, obsolescence and working capital related interest expenses.

For the OEM, there are also other hidden costs associated with bailment. Additional suppliers, additional part numbers, and additional transactions all result in additional overhead costs at the OEM level. The bailment further divides the business relationship between commercial and operational areas; it weakens the relationship among the Tier 1, the Tier 2 and the OEM. This is because commercial control remains with the OEM and the Tier 1 is preempted from using financial leverage with the Tier 2 to obtain compliance with quality and/or delivery issues. At the same time, operational responsibility to deliver quality components on time remains with the Tier 1. This presents a long-term problem and a weaker bargaining position for the Tier 1 that already face faces an OEM directed-supplier situation.

Summary

Overall, the bailment does not add real, tangible value to the supply chain. When analyzed from the holistic viewpoint of the entire supply chain, no real economic value is added. The potential for profit improvement to the OEM is problematic as there is no real cost reduction, only a shifting of costs around the system. Additionally, there is risk that additional costs will be incurred in the form of added inventory layers (with all the appurtenant cost associated with increased inventory levels), and added overheads to manage a new system. Furthermore, the majority of these overhead costs will be added by the highest cost element of the supply chain, OEM.

Bailment has historically been relegated to special circumstances to temporarily address situations where capacity is lacking or legal constraints are in play. It has been utilized in a low volume transactional mode and has been treated that way by the majority of manufacturers. To utilize it on a wholesale basis would invite supply base problems. Furthermore, the risks that accompany bailment in a troubled supplier situation are so significant as to make the entire process problematic.


Michael Marcus' experience covers both privately held and public traded companies, including Tier I and Teir II automotive suppliers.

He was named Chief Financial Officer at Freudenberg-NOKK for the NAFTA region. His experience also includes positions as Senior Consultant at BBK, Ltd and Vice President of Finance and Sdminstration at Robert Bosch Corporation. Mr. Marcus is a CPA and earned an MBA from Michigan State University and a BBa in Accounting from the University of Notre Dame.

 

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