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August/September
2004 |
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Substantive
Consolidation:
When Debtors are Joined at the Hip
| Dawn
Ragan & Michael Rosenthal
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Practitioners who regularly
advise financially distressed corporations -- and who periodically
guide those corporations through bankruptcy or liquidation cases
-- clearly understand the general requirement that such corporations
must consider the best interests of (and, indeed, may owe a fiduciary
duty to) creditors. Concepts like the “zone of insolvency”
and the ramifications of being in the “zone of insolvency”
are well known, and should be carefully explained to clients at
the very first meeting. But a related concept that may have far-reaching
implications both to creditors and equity holders of the client
– the concept of substantive consolidation-- is not as well-known
to many practitioners. Unfortunately, its significance may not
be properly explained to clients until too late in the restructuring
process.
Substantive consolidation is
the judicial doctrine by which bankruptcy courts have ordered
the assets and liabilities of two or more separate and distinct
– but related – legal entities to be combined into
a single pool. The doctrine emanates from the bankruptcy court’s
general equitable powers under section 105 of the Bankruptcy Code.
Courts most often resort to substantive consolidation in situations
where the operations or relationships of multiple debtors are
so intertwined and obscured that they cannot reasonably be untangled
or, alternatively, where the time and expense necessary to untangle
them would likely erode recovery of net assets for all creditors
and create substantial delays in effecting a distribution to creditors.
When multiple debtors are substantively
consolidated, their combined assets, for practical and legal purposes,
are merged into a single fund (i.e., the sole, surviving consolidated
debtor) from which all claims against all of the debtors are satisfied.
As a result of substantive consolidation, duplicate claims against
multiple debtors and claims by one debtor against another are
eliminated. Similarly, secured or unsecured claims against any
of the debtors are treated as secured or unsecured claims against
the consolidated debtor.
Substantive consolidation may
result in some creditors receiving more than they would potentially
have received in the absence of substantive consolidation. The
reverse could also be true. This occurs because each of the debtors
to be consolidated has its own asset and liability ratio, which
would otherwise produce a specified recovery to that entity’s
creditors. If the recovery by creditors of a particular entity
would exceed the recovery to those same creditors under substantive
consolidation, those creditors are worse off by the amount their
recovery decreases. On the other hand, creditors who would have
received little or nothing from a particular debtor will benefit
from the merger of their debtor’s assets and liabilities
with a debtor that has a more favorable asset-to-liability ratio.
In fact, this divergence in treatment between what creditors would
receive with and without substantive consolidation, in large part,
will govern which side a particular creditor takes in a substantive
consolidation fight. Not surprisingly, creditors who benefit from
substantive consolidation will argue it is appropriate, while
creditors whose recoveries will be harmed will argue it is inappropriate.
Implicit in the decision to substantively consolidate, however,
is the conclusion that the benefit accruing to the majority of
creditors outweighs the harm to any particular creditor whose
recovery will be limited as a result of consolidation.
Substantive consolidation may
also result in the increase or elimination of share-holder value.
For example, a parent company may hold all of its operating businesses
through subsidiaries with significant trade and non-trade debt,
but may be cash rich and debt free at the parent level. Absent
substantive consolidation, shareholders of the parent company
could realize the entire value of the cash. But, with substantive
consolidation, that value would have to be shared with creditors
of the substantively consolidated operating businesses.
Because of the potential detriment
or windfall to creditors and shareholders of the prospective consolidated
debtors, bankruptcy courts considering a substantive consolidation
request proceed on a case-by-case basis, examining the individual
facts and circumstances that are presented. These same facts and
circumstances must be considered by a practitioner counseling
financially distressed entities. Only if the client understands
the likelihood and ramifications of substantive consolidation
can it make an informed judgment about the course of action to
pursue that satisfies its fiduciary obligations to shareholders
and, for corporations that are insolvent or in the zone of insolvency,
to creditors.
To provide this critical advice
to a client, the practitioner must undertake an investigation
of the manner in which the debtors have conducted their affairs.
The investigation should encompass interviews with the debtors’
management, in-house and external counsel, financial advisors
or creditors committees, and analysis of public and non-public
documents and information, including public relations materials
and website disclosures that reflect how the respective debtors
hold themselves out to the public. For example, does each company
comply with corporate formalities? Does each company maintain
separate accounting records? Or, does the parent (along with its
subsidiaries) tout that it is one big, happy company and the subsidiaries
are divisions, not separate corporate entities? The facts elicited
from the investigation should assist the practitioner in advising
the client whether substantive consolidation is in the best interests
of the creditor body as a whole and should be embraced by the
client.
The elements of substantive consolidation
to be investigated, as developed and refined by the courts, include:
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(1) |
the presence of consolidated
business or financial records; |
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(2) |
parent ownership of a majority of its subsidiaries’
capital stock; |
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(3) |
intercompany guarantees; |
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(4) |
the degree of difficulty in segregating
individual assets and liabilities; |
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(5) |
the transfer of funds or assets from one
company to another without observing corporate formalities;
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(6) |
commingling of assets and business functions
between the related entities; |
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(7) |
sharing of overhead, management, accounting
and other related expenses; |
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(8) |
payment of a subsidiary’s employees
by its parent corporation; |
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(9) |
grossly inadequate capitalization of one
or more entities; |
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(10) |
common directors or officers; |
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(11) |
a subsidiary having substantially no business
except with its parent or affiliates, or no assets except
those conveyed to it by the parent or an affiliate; and |
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(12) |
parent and subsidiary acting from the same
business location. |
While the forgoing factors are
simply stated in theory, the actual application of these factors
can be problematic. Consider some of the large, highly-publicized
cases where the principal debtor purportedly has hundreds of related
legal entities - some substantive operating businesses and other
allegedly “shell” corporations (with some of those
entities having substantial assets and others having primarily
debt). Transfers between the entities for cash, inventory, expense
allocation or other items may or may not have been recorded or
documented properly. To properly account for the real assets and
liabilities of each individual entity, and to accurately estimate
potential creditor recoveries, the intercompany accounting must
be unwound. Unfortunately, the debtors’ financial records
or systems often are incomplete or inadequate, and employees with
knowledge of the transactions and relationships may no longer
be available to assist in unwinding inter-company accounting.
Fighting a substantive consolidation battle could distract the
debtors’ management and professionals and tax the estate’s
already insufficient resources – thereby delaying (and perhaps
eroding completely) distribution to creditors – with-out
necessarily enhancing overall recoveries.
The advisor to the financially
distressed debtor needs to take all of these factors into consideration
in determining whether to advise the debtor to pursue a substantive
consolidation strategy or, if a substantive consolidation motion
has been filed by another party, to advise the debtor how to respond
to such motion. But, the right course of action is not always
apparent, because what may benefit the creditors and shareholders
of one debtor may ultimately not benefit the creditors of a related
debtor that the advisor also represents. Similarly, the fiduciary
dilemma this situation presents for management and the boards
of directors of the respective companies is equally complex. None-the
less, a wise advisor should ensure that its client clearly understands
the concept of substantive consolidation when making vital restructuring
decisions that affect its future and recoveries to creditors or
stakeholders.
Dawn Ragan is a Senior Manager in the Reorganization
Services Group of Deloitte & Touche LLP. Ms. Ragan’s
responsibilities have included advising debtors, creditors and
other constituents on insolvency matters, Chapter 11 and out of
court workouts, creditor and dispute negotiation, plan and disclosure
statement development, financial analysis, office closings and
employee terminations, disposition of assets, raising new money,
compensation matters, and cash management. Ms. Ragan has covered
various industries including real estate, health care, oil and
gas, telecommunications, service businesses and distribution companies.
Ms. Ragan previously spent more than nine years on Wall Street
at Oppenheimer & Co. where she was a Vice President in the
corporate finance group performing restructuring advisory services
and a portfolio asset manager. She has also served in senior financial
and operating positions for distressed companies.
Michael A. Rosenthal is the
partner in charge of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher’s Dallas
section of the National Business Restructuring and Reorganization
Practice Group. Mr. Rosenthal specializes in insolvency, corporate
reorganization and debt restructuring matters, and has represented
debtors and acquirers of distressed businesses and assets in
a variety of business sectors, including energy, retail, manufacturing,
real estate, engineering, construction, media, telecommunications
and banking. Mr. Rosenthal has also represented creditors’
committees, secured and unsecured creditors, bondholders and
trustees, has substantial experience in out-of-court restructurings
and pre-packaged chapter 11 cases, and is one of the country’s
leading experts on restructuring issues related to companies
with asbestos and other mass tort liability.
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